Equality and CO 2 emissions distribution in climate change integrated assessment modelling by Cantore, Nicola & Padilla, Emilio
This is the published version of the article:
Cantore, Nicola; Padilla, Emilio. «Equality and CO 2 emissions distribution
in climate change integrated assessment modelling». Energy, Vol. 35 Núm. 1
(2010), p. 298-313. DOI 10.1016/j.energy.2009.09.022
This version is available at https://ddd.uab.cat/record/247638




This is the postprint version of the article: 
Cantore, N., Padilla, E. (2010) "Equality and CO2 emissions distribution in climate change integrated 
assessment modelling", Energy, Vol. 35 (1), pp. 298–313. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.09.022 
  




University of York,  Environment Department,  
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan 








The equity implications of alternative climate policy measures are an essential 
issue to be considered in the design of future international agreements to tackle 
global warming. This paper specifically analyses the future path of emissions and 
income distribution and its determinants in different scenarios. Whereas our analysis 
is driven by tools which are typically applied in the income distribution literature and 
which have recently been applied to the analysis of CO2 emissions distribution, a new 
methodological approach is that our study is driven by simulations run with the 
popular regionalised optimal growth climate change model RICE99 over the 1995-
2105 period. We find that the architecture of environmental policies, the 
implementation of flexible mechanisms and income concentration are key 
determinants of emissions distribution over time. In particular we find a robust 
positive relationship between measures of inequalities in the distribution of emissions 
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The study of the international distribution of greenhouse gas emissions is 
essential in order to analyze the problem of climate change and design control 
measures. There are major differences in the per capita emissions of the different 
regions of the world, and this inequality between regions shows different levels of 
responsibility in the contribution to climate change. An analysis of this inequality 
therefore provides information for the debate about the different control policies to 
be applied in different countries.  
Distribution has become an important issue when dealing with the negotiation 
and agreement of policies for global climate change. As recently explained by Duro 
and Padilla [1]: “The inequality in per capita CO2 emissions between countries shows 
different responsibilities in the generation of greenhouse gases and the contribution 
to climate change. Therefore, the analysis of this inequality sheds light on the debate 
about the different control and mitigation measures to be applied in different 
regions. In fact, distribution problems have become the most important issue to deal 
with in global climate change policy negotiations and agreements. Taking distribution 
problems properly into account in policy design leads to an increase in the perceived 
fairness of the measures and facilitates widespread participation” (p. 456). 
Rich countries are responsible for much higher emissions in absolute and per 
capita terms. However, the huge growth rates of CO2 emissions in some expanding 
economies means that any solution designed to stabilize atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases requires the participation of both developed and developing 




involves limiting the level of global emissions and distributing this level between the 
different countries. Several approaches to the distribution of future emission 
“entitlements” and to the distribution of abatement costs have been argued3. An 
analysis of present and future emissions distribution under different policy scenarios 
should also provide information about the distribution of future emission entitlements 
and abatement costs. Equity is a key issue to be considered in climate policies to 
insure a widespread participation of developing countries. Therefore, present and 
future equity consequences of different climate policy measures and scenarios —
including different entitlements distribution criteria— should be carefully analysed 
and considered in order to help the design of these policies. For example, mitigation 
policies increasing inequalities both in income and in the contribution to the problem 
—emissions— could not be seen as desirable or acceptable, while policies through 
which these inequalities are expected to be reduced could be seen as more desirable 
and acceptable by many more countries. 
Over the last decade, several studies have focused on the distributive analysis 
of CO2 emissions and energy consumption. Sun [2] and Alcántara and Duro [3] 
analysed inequalities in energy intensity. Heil and Wodon [4, 5], and Padilla and 
Serrano [6] use several indexes that are commonly employed in income distribution 
analysis to study the evolution of international inequality in CO2 emissions. Heil and 
Wodon [4] used a group decomposition of the Gini coefficient to study inequality in 
per capita CO2 emissions and the contribution of two income groups to this 
inequality. Heil and Wodon [5] employed the same methodology to analyze future 
                                                          
3 Distribution of entitlements in per capita terms (see e.g., Grubb [8] ; Agarwal and Narain [9]; Meyer [10]), 
distribution based on current emission levels (e.g. Pearce and Warford [11]), on GNP shares (Wirth and 
Lashof [12]; Cline [13]) and many combinations of these. As for the distribution of abatement costs, the 
proposals are mainly based on different applications of the “polluter pays” principle and indexes of ability to 




inequality in carbon emissions using projections to the year 2100, and also 
considered the scenario under the impact of the Kyoto Protocol and other mitigation 
proposals. Padilla and Serrano [6] employed concentration indexes and showed that 
inequality between rich and poor countries (concentration of emissions in richer 
countries) has diminished less than “simple” inequality in emissions, and showed the 
contribution of four income groups to inequality through a Theil index decomposition. 
Duro and Padilla [7] explain the main sources of emission inequality by decomposing 
international inequality in CO2 emissions into the different Kaya factors and two 
interaction terms, and also decompose emissions inequality between and within 
groups of countries.  
On other branches of research, Miketa and Shrattenholzer [15] analyse the 
future differences in the allocation of emission entitlements to different regions 
according to two burden-sharing rules —“equal emissions per capita” and “carbon 
intensity” approaches— in a scenario of global carbon-emission path until the year 
2050 that leads to stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentration at 550 ppm. Their study 
does not consider trade in emission permits. They use the general equilibrium model 
MERGE. Leimbach [16] analyses how the “equal per capita allocation principle” 
influences the intertemporal emission paths and the mitigation costs of different 
regions in the long run, in a scenario which restricts temperature change to 0.2ºC 
per decade and 2ºC in 2100. He takes into account the effects of emission permits 
trade. He uses the ICLIPS integrated assessment model. Vaillancourt and Waaub 
[17] analyse the consequences of two weight sets of allocation criteria (which take 
into account several equity criteria and regional interests) for the allocation of 




concentration stabilization level at 550 ppm. They use the TIMES energy model. In 
Vaillancourt and Waaub [18], they also analyse the costs for each region in each 
case with projections to the year 2050 and consider the effects of emissions trading. 
They employ the MARKAL world energy model. 
In this paper our original contribution will be to employ distributive analysis 
tools —such as the computation of inequality and concentration indexes— to analyse 
the distribution of emissions between different regions and groups of regions for 
different future scenarios involving international agreements designed to deal with 
the issue of climate change. To do this, we will use the popular climate change 
optimal growth model RICE99. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to use integrated assessment models together with distributive analysis tools for this 
purpose, and it is our intuition that the optimal growth models that are typically used 
to investigate such traditional analyses as technological change (Kypreos [19]), 
policy costs (Manne and Stephan [20]), timing of abatement (Goulder and _Mathai 
[21]) and scenario analyses (Turton [22]) could also be used effectively for a wider 
range of scientific analyses. Moreover, we investigate a much wider range of 
scenarios and climate policy alternatives than the previous studies that used 
integrated assessment models for the study of equity implications of different 
scenarios  
The second relevant original contribution of this paper is that we connect the 
findings from future projections of emissions distribution to previous studies dealing 
with time series from historical data. Finally our paper represents the first attempt to 




and also analyses a wider set of scenarios than the previous studies that analyse the 
distributive implications of trade.  
In section 2 we explain the model and scenarios. Section 3 presents our results 
for different scenarios of emissions reduction. Section 4 undertakes a sensitivity 
analysis for different parameters values. Section 5 analyses the results for different 
equity principles for a given level of atmospheric carbon concentration. Section 6 
presents the results for different scenarios when emission trading is implemented. 
The paper ends with our conclusions.  
2. Model and scenarios 
Nordhaus and Boyer’s RICE [23] is a regional dynamic general equilibrium 
model for the study of the economic aspects of climate change. The RICE model4 
basically considers a single sector optimal growth model by suitably incorporating the 
interactions between economic activities and climate. The world is divided into eight 
macro regions: USA, Other High Income countries (OHI), OECD Europe (Europe), 
Eastern European countries (EE), Middle Income countries (MI), Lower Middle 
Income countries (LMI), China (CHN), and Low Income countries (LI). Within each 
region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and carbon 
energy input that maximize the present value of per capita consumption. Nordhaus 
and Boyer’s starting assumption is that a Social Planner optimally runs its own 
region, indexed by n, by maximizing a discounted utility function.   
The maximization process is subject to some constraints that capture the 
economic as well as environmental dynamics. 
                                                          
4 In this paper we use the original model set up. We refer to Nordhaus and Boyer [23] for parameters 
calibration and for a deeper explanation of equations. The Appendix 1 contains a list of variables and 




The Resource Constraint for each region links consumption with net output Y 
and with physical investments I. The following equation identifies the Resource 
Constraint5: 
 C(n,t) = Y(n,t) – I(n,t) (1) 
The gross value added obtained from a Cobb Douglas production process with 
constant returns to scale is described by the following equation: 
 Q(n,t) = A(n,t)[K(n,t)CE(n,t)n)L(n,t)(1--n))] - pe(t)CE(n,t)  (2) 
Where A(n,t) denotes the state of the technology, K(n,t) is physical capital, CE(n,t) is 
carbon energy, and pe(t) is the cost of carbon energy. Apart from A(n,t) and L(n,t), 
all of the inputs in this value-added equation are endogenously determined. The 
evolution of A(n,t) represents total factor productivity (TFP) growth by production-
enhancing technological change. In the model TFP growth is assumed to slow 
gradually over the next three centuries until eventually stopping. 
There is a wedge between gross and net output production due to global 
warming that creates environmental damages. The environmental damage is a key 
variable influencing how the model captures capital accumulation by including 
natural resources. In RICE-99, a supply curve for carbon-energy is introduced. The 
supply curve allows for limited (albeit huge) long-run supplies at rising costs. 
Because of the optimal-growth framework, carbon-energy is efficiently allocated 
across time. Scarcity is only reflected in the cost of carbon. 
                                                          
5 When we introduce an emissions permit market, equation (1) should also include the revenue (expenditure) 




In the function expressing the level of emissions the green technological effect is 
described by: 
 E(n,t) =ζ(n,t)CE(n,t) +ETREE(n,t) (3) 
Where E(n,t) represents the level of industrial CO2 emissions and ETREE(n,t) is 
a regional exogenous variable representing CO2 land use emissions
6. The coefficient 
(n,t) in (3) represents the emissions/carbon-energy ratio and captures the 
environmental-friendly form of technological change of the RICE99 model: emission-
reducing technological change. This index of carbon intensity is exogenously 
determined and follows a negative exponential path over time. It represents the 
assumption of a costless improvement in green technology gained by agents over 
time. Total emissions will be derived from the sum of industrial emissions and 
emissions from land use. 
Emissions determine atmospheric carbon concentration, atmospheric carbon 
concentration determines the radiative forcing, the radiative forcing is the main 
variable expressing the temperature increase relative to 1990 levels.  
The RICE99 model is our tool for investigating the relationship between income 
distribution and emissions distribution. We will use techniques derived from the 
inequality literature such as those in Padilla and Serrano [6]. The main difference is 
that whereas Padilla and Serrano base their analysis on historical data, in this paper 
we will analyse projections of results derived from a popular climate change optimal 
growth model. 
                                                          
6 Other GHG are included in the RICE99 model by an exogenous variable O(t) affecting radiative forcing and 




The main difficulty we faced was uncertainty. Projections of relevant economic 
and environmental variables over time strongly depend on the assumptions and 
calibration of the model and on the political and social evolutions derived from the 
future international setting. One method for overcoming the limitations of modelling 
is to implement a wide comparison of models. However, this procedure is extremely 
time consuming and does not guarantee information of any added value. We believe 
it is more reasonable to work with the highly popular DICE/RICE family of climate 
change models that have been widely used in science to tackle the “hot” topics of 
global warming (Toth [24], Nordhaus and Yang [25], Castelnuovo et al. [26], 
Gerlagh [27], Bosetti et al. [28]). Simulations run with the RICE99 model in a 
Business as usual scenario in which no regions take actions to reduce greenhouse 
gases by a sensitivity analysis for some crucial parameters do not provide significant 
variations in the results about emissions distribution. A Sensitivity analysis was run 
on the pure rate of time preference (BAU vs hyperbolic discounting with a 0.125% 
decline rate), on the curvature of the utility function (BAU vs decreasing elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption with a 0.125% declining rate), the depreciation rate 
of capital (BAU vs +/- 10%) and the sensitivity of radiative forcing to atmospheric 
carbon concentration (BAU vs +/- 10%). 
The uncertainty surrounding the future evolution of the international political 
framework is dealt with by an extensive analysis of scenarios. Unlike Heil and 
Woodon [5] (the only previous distributive analysis of future international CO2 






[Table 1 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 1, in all scenarios we assume that all Annex I countries 
except the USA accomplish by 2015 the 2008–2012 Kyoto emissions target. 
Scenarios differ for different assumptions concerning post Kyoto agreements. We ran 
scenarios implying emission stabilizing policies and global atmospheric constraints. 
For emission stabilizing policies we assume 3 cases: in the first, the “Kyoto -10%” 
scenario, Annex I regions (excluding the United States) are subject to a further 10% 
reduction in emissions in 2025 and are then obliged to maintain the same emissions 
cap forever (Bosetti and Buchner [29]). The United States and developing countries 
observe a BAU policy. In the “Kyoto + USA” scenario, the USA joins the Kyoto -10% 
scenario  (Galeotti [30], Cantore [31]) in 2035 and stabilizes its level of emissions at 
the 2025 level7. In the Global Kyoto scenario, from 2035 developing countries also 
decide to join the Kyoto -10% together with the USA (Böhringer and Löschel [32]). 
We also assume two cases for the global atmospheric constraints: in the “Conc” 
scenario from 2025 we assume a cost effective 550 ppm global atmospheric 
constraint for all regions (Gerlagh [33]). In the “Temp” scenario we assume a 2.5 
degrees C global atmospheric constraint (van der Zwaan et al. [34]). For each 
scenario we assume two kinds of cases: “trading” and “non trading”. In the former 
we assume efficiency in the accomplishment of the emissions cap through an 
emissions permit market that guarantees regions the lowest abatement costs. In the 
latter we assume the absence of an emissions permits market. 
                                                          
7 The State of California’s recent decision to join the Kyoto Protocol after the Bush administration had rejected 




Technically an emissions permit market is introduced in the context of an open 
loop Nash equilibrium. Each region maximizes its “utility” subject to the climate 
module and the economic and emission target constraints for a given optimal set of 
strategies for all the other players and a given price of permits. In the first round, 
the price of permits is an arbitrary value. When all regions choose their optimal 
strategies, the overall net demand of permits affects the market price. If the sum of 
net demands in each period is close to zero, the process generates a Nash 
equilibrium, otherwise the price varies in proportion to the market imbalance and the 
process starts again (Bosetti et al.,[24]).  
It is very difficult to implement a scenario ranking according to the likelihood of 
occurrence. Böhringer and Löschel [28] attempted to consider the most likely 
scenarios according to expert opinions, but there are still major doubts in terms of 
the political variables that will affect future international evolution8. Our strategy is to 
consider a wide spectrum of possible scenarios and assess the consequences derived 
from each. The following section summarizes the results. 
3. Results for different scenarios of emissions reduction 
A number of interesting results can be derived from our analysis of the 1995–
2105 period, which can be compared with those found by Padilla and Serrano (2006) 
for historical data for the 1971–1999 period and by Heil and Wodon [5] for their 
projection of future emissions for the 1993–2100 period. However, there are some 
differences with respect to the data employed by Padilla and Serrano [6] that should 
be taken into account. They used IEA data on CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. 
This data does not include land use emissions, which are much more important in 
                                                          
8 Modelling and estimating CO2 emissions and income projections over the next century is a difficult challenge, 




poor countries. This explains why the inequality and concentration indexes for CO2 
emissions found in their study are greater than the ones found here. These 
differences in data also explain why the Kakwani index (see Figure 4) is much lower 
in our study.  
As a first step we compare the Gini index for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
representing the concentration of income between regions (GDP Gini index)9 and the 
pseudo Gini index for CO2 emissions (CO2 pGini index or CO2 concentration index), 
which measures inequality in the distribution of emissions between regions ranked 
according to their level of income per capita, i.e. the degree of concentration of 
emissions in richer countries10. We consider that the CO2 p-Gini concept is relevant 
for discussions of climate distribution issues, as these discussions focus on the 
distribution of emissions between poor and rich countries11. Just for clarity, the 
reader should consider that the measures of inequality between different regions are 
computed taking the per capita values of each region, each one weighted by 
population in the global computation of inequality.  
In a BAU scenario the concentration of income and the CO2 pseudo Gini index 
are both decreasing (see Figures 1 and 2). That is, the concentration of income and 
CO2 emissions in rich regions decreases over time. The result is confirmed in those 
scenarios assuming a modest reduction in emissions only for developed countries 
(“Kyoto – 10%”, “Kyoto – 10% + USA”) or a relatively balanced reduction in 
                                                          
9 The GDP Gini index shows inequality in income distribution. This index is computed through the Lorenz curve, 
the curve that shows the degree of income inequality, i.e., the percentage of income received by different 
percentages of population, ordered in increasing value of per capita income. 
10 The CO2 pGini index is computed through the concentration curve of emissions, curve that shows the 
percentage of emissions that concentrate different shares of population, ordered in increasing value of per 
capita income (and not according to per capita emissions as would be the case if we computed the Gini index) 
11 However, for the 8 regions considered in this study there is very little difference (less than 1%) between CO2 
p-Gini and CO2 Gini, which shows the importance of per capita income differences in explaining the 




emissions in developed and developing countries (“Conc” see Table 2 ). However, 
even in the cases in which inequality reduction is greater there are still considerably 
high levels of inequality in emissions and GDP. As in Padilla and Serrano’s study [6] 
of historical emissions data, in our analysis involving future projections we are able 
to can confirm that inequality in income distribution is positively related to inequality 
in emissions distribution from a “between group perspective”. However, the “Global 
Kyoto” scenario shows a remarkable increase in emissions inequality, and the “Temp” 
scenario shows almost not change at the end the period. These scenarios also show 
a mildly lower reduction in income inequalities, which is explained by the stronger 
mitigation effort for poor regions they involve. As a result, in these scenarios, which 
involve a strong and disproportionate abatement effort for developing countries, 
there is an ambiguous relationship between the CO2 pseudo Gini index and the GDP 
Gini index (see Figure 3). Whereas income concentration is still decreasing, global 
environmental constraints could require a major effort to reduce emissions in 
developing countries implying a higher concentration of emissions activities in Annex 
I regions. The general finding is that the concentrations of emissions per capita and 
income per capita are positively correlated. However, major environmental policies 
involving a strong effort by developing countries break this relationship. In short, the 
application of the RICE99 model allowed us to conclude that mitigation policies such 
as the stated in the “Global Kyoto no trading” and “Temp no trading” scenarios could 
break the relationship between the concentration of income and the emissions per 
capita. Politics and marginal abatement costs could play a crucial role in determining 
the future link between emissions and income distribution respectively for emission 





[Table 2 and figures 1,2,3 about here] 
 
In the next step, we make a more in-depth investigation of the magnitude of 
changes in income and emissions distribution. This issue has major implications in 
terms of the “regressivity” of emissions distribution over time. Distribution of CO2 
emissions is “progressive” when it shows a pGini of CO2 emissions (index computed 
by ranking regions by level of income per capita) which is lower than the 
concentration of income, that is, emissions are less unequally distributed than 
income. For this purpose we calculate the Kakwani index. The Kakwani index 
computes the extent to which inequality in the distribution of emissions between 
richer and poorer countries is greater than inequality in the distribution of income. In 
other words, the Kakwani index computes the level of “progressivity” or 
“regressivity” of the distribution of emissions. This index is equal to the CO2 pGini 
index minus the GDP Gini index.  
This index shows the degree to which the inequality in the “responsibilities” in 
the contribution to the problem is greater or lower than income inequality under the 
different scenarios taken into account12. In all scenarios we always find a negative 
Kakwani index. That is, RICE99 clearly indicates that the concentration of emissions 
would be smaller than the concentration of income, that is, the concentration of 
emissions is “progressive” whatever the design of the future international 
agreements (see Figure 4). Therefore, in richer countries emissions are less 
                                                          
12 Moreover, other things equal, a policy whose emissions allocation strongly increased this 
“regressivity” or decreased this “progressivity” could be considered to penalise developing 
countries more than a policy which did not lead to this result —as far as emissions trade or other 




concentrated than income. This result can again be compared to that found by 
Padilla and Serrano [6] which found a positive Kakwani index for several years. The 
more “progressive” concentration of emissions found in our study is basically the 
result of differences in the data employed, which in our case includes land use 
change emissions. These emissions are much more important in poor countries, thus 
attenuating CO2 inequality between countries. The authors find a positive or close to 
zero Kakwani index in the 1971–1999 period except in the mid 1980s when the oil 
crisis reduced emissions in developed countries. RICE99 is a deterministic optimal 
growth model and does not assume energy market crises. The results of our 
simulations show that a “progressive” distribution of emissions could also be 
obtained in a deterministic framework —in which no crises induce a rise in fossil fuel 
prices and lower emissions by developed countries— as far as all emission sources 
are considered in the analysis. This result strictly depends on the calibrated values of 
the regional parameters A (total factor productivity, see equation 2) and ζ(n,t) 
(emissions/carbon energy ratio, see equation 3) which respectively regulate the 
output convergence among regions and environmentally friendly technological 
change. RICE99 provides the insight that the evolution of future industrial and 
environmental technology will be crucial in determining the relationship between 
emissions and income distribution. However the results also show that in every 
scenario the gap between the GDP Gini index and the CO2 pGini index will diminish 
over time. This decrease in “progressivity” in emissions distribution will be higher in 
such scenarios as the “Global Kyoto” assuming a major abatement effort in 






[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Previous findings can be further investigated by analyzing the determinants of 
emissions distribution over time. Specifically, the decomposition of inequality index is 
a useful tool for achieving this. We use the Theil index rather than the Gini index. As 
the inequality literature shows, the Gini index of inequality can be decomposed into a 
“Between group”, a “Within group” and a residual component whose interpretation 
has been widely debated in income distribution literature (Lambert [35]). To yield a 
clearer interpretation, we use the Theil index for our CO2 inequality decomposition 
analysis. The Theil index can be simply decomposed into “Between group” and 
“Within group” inequality components. Our aim is to verify the proportion 
representing the Between group component and consequently the emissions 
inequality between different income groups of countries in terms of the overall 
inequality in emissions distribution. We aggregate RICE99 regions as 3 groups: High 
Income (USA, OHI and Western Europe), Medium Income (Eastern Europe, MI and 
LMI) and Low Income Countries (China and LI). 
We find an interesting set of results that can be compared in turn to those 
found by Padilla and Serrano [6] to check the consistency between past and future 
paths of emissions and income distribution in different scenarios.  
First, in the BAU, Kyoto – 10%, Kyoto – 10% + USA and Conc we find 
contiguity between Padilla and Serrano results’ [6] and our own. In both studies 
there is a decrease in the simple emissions inequality of both the Between group and 




environmental policies determine a strong imbalance in the effort to reduce 
emissions (Temp and Global Kyoto Scenario). In this case the Theil index together 
with its decomposition factors (the Between and the Within group components) are 
increasing.  
Second, we find that in each scenario the Between group component is the 
most important over time and its contribution is always higher than 75%. This means 
that RICE99 shows that whatever the future set of climate agreements the Between 
group component and inequality in the distribution of emissions between rich and 
poor regions will be the most important driving forces and will explain more than ¾ 
of future emissions inequality. This result strongly supports that offered by Padilla 
and Serrano [6] and shows that the Between group component, which has already 
played a crucial role in the past, will continue to explain most inequalities in 
emissions in the future. Moreover these findings are also confirmed in those 
scenarios (Global Kyoto and Temp) that we previously claimed did not generate a 
clear positive relationship between income and emissions distribution. These findings 
also show that when the path of inequality in income does not provide strong 
evidence to govern the path of emissions distribution over time, emissions 
distribution is still mainly explained by differences in income between regions.  
Third, in contrast to Padilla and Serrano’s analysis [6] of past emissions, this 
study does not provide robust evidence of an increasing percentage of the Between 
group component over time, but this could in part depend on the different group 
aggregation and on the assumptions and calibration of the RICE99 model 13. As 
Tables 3–8 show, this result is strongly driven by an increase in Within group 
                                                          
13
 Their study uses individualized data for 113 countries and divides them into four income groups, while here we have 




inequality in the Low Income Group, which is determined by the outstanding growth 
in China in comparison with that experienced by other low income regions. 




4. Results for different equity principles in a 550 ppm global 
atmospheric scenario.  
 
We have verified that our results are robust across emissions reducing scenarios —
except in those implying a strong and disproportionate abatement effort for 
developing countries. Now, we investigate how the distribution of emissions can be 
affected when we consider the same global emissions reduction target but the 
abatement burden is shared among regions according to different equity principles. 
We consider as benchmark the “Conc" scenario in which we introduced a global 
upper bound of 550 ppm atmospheric carbon concentration and a cost effective 
abatement burden sharing. 
As summarized in the table 11 we consider three alternative equity principles: 
the sovereignty rule (CONCSOV), the equality principle rule (CONCEQUAL) as 
implemented in Cantore [36] and the Brasilian proposal (CONCBRAS) rule 
representing a very interesting policy proposal14. The sovereignty rule is a policy 
option in which the abatement burden is shared across regions according to the 
future evolution of BAU emissions. With the Brasilian proposal rule the abatement 
                                                          
14 Equity principles are implemented in two steps. We first calculate the global reduction derived from the cost 
effective scenario Conc. Then for each period and region we impose an emissions constraint that is 




burden is shared according to the historical responsibility of countries in generating 
atmospheric carbon concentration according to the Den Helzen and Schaeffer [37] 
research study15. With the equalitarian rule an upper bound of emissions is 
introduced to countries in order to reach an equal level of emissions per capita 
according to their future level of population16.  
 As we can see from Figure 13, the sovereignty rule and the Brasilian proposal 
generate a redistribution of emissions: past and future responsibility of rich countries 
in generating atmospheric carbon concentration induces their higher abatement 
effort and a redistributive effect. 
Redistribution is particularly strong in the equalitarian scenario. An equal 
emissions per capita scenario would imply a 0 value of the Gini index. As can be 
noticed from Figure 13, the pseudo Gini inequality index is slightly higher than 0. In 
the LI region the emissions per capita upper bound is not binding and is higher than 
the optimal level of emissions per capita. “CONCEQUAL” and “CONCBRAS” scenarios 
lead to the greatest reduction in CO2 and —although less remarkable— income 
inequalities, as well as the lowest reduction in the progressivity of emissions 
distribution. 
 In spite of the fact that the application of equity principles generates a strong 
redistribution of emissions, we always confirm that the Between group component of 
inequality is predominant (Table 12), the Kakwani index is always negative (Figure 
14) and the inequalities in the distributions of emissions and income appear to be 
                                                          
15 In Den Helzen and Schaeffer [37]the historical responsibility of countries from 1751 to 1990 is shared with a 
different regional aggregation than the one of RICE99. For this reason we take data about the historical 
responsibility for Annex I and non Annex I countries from the Den Helzen and Schaeffer study and we share 
the abatement burden by applying the same reduction percentage to Annex I regions (USA, OHI, Europe, EE) 
and non Annex I regions (MI, LMI, China and LI) in RICE99. 
16 When we introduce the equalitarian principle the optimal level of emissions per capita can be lower than the 
upper bound for some regions over time. In this case the level of atmospheric carbon concentration is slightly 




decreasing and correlated (figures 12 and 13). The magnitude of variations of 
income inequality is not very relevant. However, it can be noticed that CONCBRAS 
and especially CONCEQUAL are the scenarios in which income inequality decreases 
most. In these cases, climate change policies could make a (modest) contribution to 
the reduction of problem of inequality in income distribution. This may be clearer in 
the case of considering flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading (see next 
section). 
 [Figures 5, 6, 7 about here] 
[Table 4, 5 about here] 
 
 
5. Results for different scenarios of emissions reduction: the 
implementation of flexible mechanisms. 
 
 
Finally, unlike Heil and Wodon [5] we also analyze the role of flexible 
mechanisms in income and emissions distributions in the context of emissions 
stabilizing policies. Some other studies have also analysed some equity implications 
of emissions trading for future paths of income and emissions. Vaillancourt and 
Waaub [18] employed an energy model (MARKAL) for analysing implications in terms 
of the different percentage of emissions allocated to different regions and the 
different reduction cost ranges for different regions under different allocation criteria 
for years 2010 and 2050. Leimbach [16] employed an integrated assessment model 




capita allocation principle in terms of the different losses in per capita consumption 
for 4 scenarios (restricted vs. unrestricted trade; and 2025 vs. 2100 as year in which 
equal per capita distribution takes full effect). Both studies show that emissions 
trading could both increase efficiency as well as lead to different per capita 
abatement costs in different regions, with negative abatement costs for some 
developing regions, which may gain from international emissions trade. This is 
especially evident in the case analysed by Leimbach [16], which implies a per capita 
equity criteria in the distribution of emission rights. Here we will employ the RICE99 
model to study how the possibility of emissions trade can, under different policy 
scenarios, lead to a different evolution of inequality both in emissions and income 
over the period 1995–2100. 
Our results show that, when we investigate scenarios involving different 
emissions reductions, trading does not significantly influence emissions and income 
distribution for most of the scenarios considered. Emissions trading is a crucial 
mechanism governing the efficiency of policy implementation and compliance costs 
but for two of the considered scenarios its impact on inequality indexes are almost 
negligible (“Kyoto – 10%” and “Kyoto – 10% + USA” scenarios), while for other two 
there are some small differences in emissions inequalities (“Temp” and “Conc” 
scenarios). The only exception is the “Global Kyoto” scenario (see Figures 8–12). In 
the “Global Kyoto” scenario, when we implement trading, non Annex I regions buy a 
huge quantity of permits and we observe a redistribution of emissions towards poor 
countries. Trade has also a small impact on income inequality, which decreases more 




of disproportionate mitigation efforts required to developing countries in this 
scenario.  
As those scenarios involving a 550 ppm global atmospheric constraint with 
different equality principles results are quite interesting. In contrast to the Global 
Kyoto scenario for the CONCSOV, CONCBRAS and CONCEQUAL scenarios we find 
that trading increases inequality in the distribution of emissions as developed 
countries are buyers in the emissions permits market (see Figures 13, 14, 15).  
In other words the magnitude and the sign of the impact of trading on 
emissions distribution essentially depend on the structure of marginal costs for each 
country, on the level of global abatement reduction and especially on how the 
abatement effort is shared among regions. However, the magnitude of the impacts 
of environmental constraints on the economic variables does not appear to be too 
relevant in terms of inequality evolution for most of the scenarios considered in this 
section. 
As proof of the fact that the impact on emissions distribution is more relevant 
than that on GDP distribution, in the scenario CONCEQUAL involving the widest 
emissions redistribution, the highest impact is associated to United States that are 
heavily penalised and that can gain by trading of permits in terms of more output 
(+17% in 2105) by producing a 5 times higher level of emissions17. In the 
CONCEQUAL scenario together with CONCBRAS and CONSOV, emissions trading 
generates a modest income inequality increase. In these cases trading creates a 
mechanism in which the flow of money from rich (buyers) to poor countries (sellers) 
                                                          
17 Roson and Bosello [38] find by a RICE-type model only a - 6% variation of an equity index for GDP due to the 




deriving from the permits market is more than compensated by cost savings that are 
mainly concentrated in developed regions. 
 
[Figures 8,9,10,11,12, 13, 14, 15 about here] 
 
 
6. Results for different parameters values: a sensitivity analysis 
 
As we said previously our results are robust to sensitivity analyses run on 
crucial scalars like the pure rate of time preference, the depreciation rate of capital, 
the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and the sensitivity of radiative forcing 
to atmospheric carbon concentration. However regional parameters rather than 
world scalars could also play a role in affecting the distribution of emissions. 
For this reason, we analyse the TFP parameter (A(n,t) in the production 
function equation 2), the carbon intensity parameter (ζ(n,t) in the emissions equation 
3) and population (L(n,t) in the production function equation 2). As those parameters 
are different for each region we simplify the scenarios implementation by assuming 
the same percentage of increase/reduction of parameters for all regions in a specific 
macro-region. In particular, we assume increases/decreases of the TFP and 
population parameters for Poor countries and increases/decreases of the carbon 
intensity parameters for the Rich macroregion. Of course, this analysis includes only 
the investigation of a small set of parameters and macroregions, but we deem this 
experiment as meaningful to verify the stability of model results by varying crucial 





We mainly focus on the Poor macro-region including China and LI because as 
outlined by Nordhaus [39]: “Many elements, particularly the assumptions for 
developing economies and economies in transition, are difficult to validate or 
estimate and are subject to large and growing projection errors as they run further 
into the future” (p. 125). The choice to run a sensitivity analysis to the carbon 
intensity parameter for the rich countries derives from the recent USA’s policy 
proposal to reduce carbon intensity (-18%) rather than the absolute value of 
emissions. Therefore we are interested in verifying how significant variations of the 
carbon intensity parameter for rich countries can affect the distribution of emissions 
over time. 
The summary of the scenarios is included in Table 6 and results are presented 
in the table 7. We assume wide variations of the three parameters in the range 
[+30%, - 30%] to verify how robust our findings are. 
 Results are quite consistent. An increase/decrease of the TFP parameter for 
developing countries decreases/increases inequality in the distribution of output and 
emissions. This finding is quite intuitive. A faster growth for poor regions shrinks the 
gap in the level of output per capita and emissions per capita between rich and poor 
regions.  
 An increase/decrease of the population path increases/decreases inequality in 
the distribution of income and emissions in the first decades even if outcomes are 
more ambigous over time. In the first decades, an increase in population for 
developing countries increases the output levels, but output per capita and emissions 




 An increase/decrease in the carbon intensity of rich countries 
increases/decreases the inequality in the distribution of emissions. An increase in the 
carbon content for each unit of consumed energy increases aggregate emissions 
levels for rich regions and consequently the level of emissions per capita being the 
population path as unchanged over time. When we vary the carbon intensity 
parameter we do not register significant variations of income distribution (Figure 7) 
as technological change is costless and benefits are enjoyed only in the medium-long 
term due to lower environmental damage. 
 A more general conclusion that we notice from our results is that we can 
confirm the results coming from the previous section: 
- Inequalities in the distributions of income and emissions are decreasing and 
appear to be correlated; 
- The Between group component of inequality in the distribution of emissions 
is predominant (Table 8); 
- The Kakwani index is always negative (Figure 16). 
Therefore, strong parameters variation does not affect the RICE99 findings on 
future emissions and income distribution under different mitigation policy scenarios 
presented in the previous section. 
[Figure 16, 17, 18 about here] 
[Tables 6, 7, 8 about here] 
A final test that we want to run is to verify if our results also hold when we consider 
Purchase Parity Power (PPP) values rather than Market Exchange Rates (MER) to 




literature by those researchers claiming that MER values may lead to an upward bias 
of emissions and level of temperature (Manne et al. [40]). Nordhaus and Boyer, 
when they set up the RICE99 model criticize the PPP approach and provide strong 
motivations to support the MER approach.18.  
However in our context PPP values to express output could be useful to interpret 
meaningfully results coming from the elaboration of the Kakwani index. Our intuition 
is that the investigation of the effects deriving from PPP on our findings about equity  
could provide useful additional information and test robustness of the results 
obtained with MER values. To transform GDP values we follow a suggestion from 
Nordhaus and Boyer who claim [23]: “If users would like to convert the data to PPP 
income levels, the levels of output can of course be scaled by a factor to represent 
living standards at a particular time” (chapter 3, p. 5). In other words the authors 
suggest to assume equal growth rates in a MER and PPP environment and to scale 
results from simulations expressed in MER values to PPP values. To scale our results 
we follow the procedure adopted by Manne et al. [40] who calculate the PPP/MER 
ratio for each region on the basis of the following hyperbolic function: 
 










                                                          
18 They claim [23]: “While it is common practice to use output measured at international or 
purchasing-power parity (PPP) exchange rates, this is inappropriate in the current context for three 
reasons. First, since historical output data at market exchange rates is more readily available than at 
PPP rates, we rely on these data to make projections about future growth in output and carbon 
intensity. In order for the output levels we project to be consistent with our projected output and 
carbon intensity growth rates, we define them as output at market exchange rates. Second, in the 
context of optimizing a country's consumption path, it should use its internal prices rather than the 
world average price level. Third, international trading in carbon emissions permits will take place at 
market exchange rates, so output needs to be measured in market exchange rates for consistency in 
measurement between trade flows and economic production as well as between the marginal cost of 






We calibrate the value of K(t) since 1995 to 2085 by matching the PPP/MER ratio 
arising from the CPI baseline (von Vuuren et al. [41]) when we consider the world 
level of GDP per capita. We apply the PPP/MER regional ratios on the levels of output 
that we obtained through our sensitivity analysis in each scenario. Not surprisingly 
and in line with results of Manne et al. [40] the highest PPP/MER ratios are 
associated to China and Low Income Countries (the figure 18 presents MER GDP per 
capita, PPP GDP per capita and emissions per capita in a BAU scenario). When we 
consider PPP values, though all the inequality indices are confirmed to show a 
decreasing path over time, we observe a strong redistribution of the GDP Gini index 
towards poor regions, whereas the emissions pseudo Gini index and the ranking of 
regions in terms of GDP per capita influencing the decomposition of the Theil index 
are substantially unaffected.  
 
Therefore the most interesting variation concerning the PPP context if compared to 
the MER context that we examined before concerns the Kakwani index. In particular 
for every scenario we notice an upward shift of the Kakwani index that remains 
negative only in the short term (see figure 17). Our results show that when we 
consider the distribution of income the choice between PPP values and MER values 
matters. These results complement those of Nordhaus and Boyer claiming that the 
introduction of PPP values “has little substantive effect” on the level of income and 
those of Manne and Richels [40] claiming that “Employing a computable general 
equilibrium model designed to examine a variety of issues in the climate debate, we 








In this paper we investigate how future scenarios involving different climate 
policies could affect emissions and income distribution over time. In spite of the 
limits of our investigation deriving from restrictive model assumptions and calibration 
and from the acknowledgment that in our study inequality refers to a cross country 
concept by hypothesising homogenous consumers and polluters within each region, 
we find a set of interesting findings derived from simulations.  
First, we find a robust correlation between measures of inequality in income 
and emissions distribution. This result agrees with previous analogous studies. Of 
course, environmental policies could have an impact on the robustness of this 
finding. Specifically, we have shown that international climate agreements that 
penalise heavily developing countries could provide a contextual reduction of equality 
together with a redistribution of emissions towards developed countries. In these 
cases, evidence of a strong relationship between the evolution of inequalities in 
income and emissions distributions appears ambiguous, but the Between group 
component and consequently the differences in GDP per capita between rich and 
poor regions continue to be the most important determinants of emissions 
distribution. Moreover, as stated by Vaillancourt and Waaub [18] “the fact that the 
climate policies should not accentuate the inequalities between the developed 




the policy scenarios leading to these results (Global Kyoto) can hardly be justified on 
equity grounds.  
Another important implication for policy-making of the strong correlation 
between the inequalities in income and emissions per capita is that international 
policies oriented by the equity perspective of approaching to an equal per capita 
emissions rights criteria —a fair share of atmosphere— and so aiming at reducing the 
inequality in the distribution of emissions, would be more feasible if there were a 
reduction in income inequality between rich and poor countries. Global policies aimed 
at improving income equality would lead to reduce emissions inequality. 
The great current inequalities involve that short-term measures focused on 
reducing emissions in rich countries might still be effective for controlling the 
evolution of global emissions for some years. Nevertheless, in the medium and long 
term the expected economic growth of developing economies (which will reduce 
income and emission inequalities) means that effective climate measures require the 
participation of developing economies. This result reinforces the need to take into 
account the distribution consequences of the different policy alternatives in order to 
facilitate the participation of developing countries in the global policy measures. 
Second, unlike previous studies, we provide an examination of the 
“progressivity” of future emissions distribution in comparison to income concentration 
through the Kakwani index. Mitigation policies involving a strong mitigation effort by 
developing regions might lead to a strong reduction of this “progressivity”. This, 
other things equal and in the absence of flexible mechanisms and/or economic 




they lead to a negative redistribution of the assimilative capacity of the atmosphere 
by requiring a relatively disproportionate effort by poorer countries.  
However, emissions distribution will also be governed by changes in green 
technology in different countries. A lower technological gap for abatement activities 
between developed and developing countries could lead to an increase in the 
concentration of emissions in rich regions and to a decrease of this “progressivity”. 
On the other hand, a reduction in “progressivity” could also be induced by a 
reduction in the gap between countries in terms of industrial technology enhancing 
productivity inputs and determining a lower concentration of income over time. For 
both changes to industrial and green technology, diffusion caused by spillover effects 
will be crucial for influencing technological differences between developing and 
developed countries and consequently the “progressivity” of emissions distribution 
over time. Of course, it should be noticed that achieving a more equal distribution of 
emissions is not the only relevant goal because of the different efforts and/or 
benefits implied by the different allocation of the assimilative capacity of the 
atmosphere it implies. Therefore the reduction of “progressivity” in emissions 
distribution could also be seen as a consequence of the improvement in other 
important goals, such as reducing emissions and/or income inequality.  These are 
complex trade off that policy makers should manage carefully and for which science 
could provide answers through multicriteria analysis or social choice tools.  
Moreover, this “progressivity” in the concentration of emissions with respect to 
income inequality is expected to experience a considerable reduction during the 
period considered due to the reduction in emissions from land use change in poorer 




if PPP values or MER values is more appropriate to run equality analyses is beyond 
the aims of our paper, but we deem very important to underline that results are 
quite sensitive to this methodology adopted for the GDP measurement. Our 
elaborations clearly show that in a PPP context the distribution of emissions will 
remain “progressive” only in the short run and stimulate further research on the 
discrepancy arising between results in fields of research outside equity and climate 
change issues. 
Third, a sensitivity analysis on different parameter values of the model shows 
the consistency of the results. 
Fourth, the consideration of different equity criteria for a given level of global 
emissions reduction lead to different results in terms of the evolution of emissions 
inequality, while the consequences on income inequality are much lower. 
Finally, we showed that emissions distribution could depend not only on climate 
policies but also on the flexible mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing efficiency in the 
accomplishment of emissions constraints. Whereas for some scenarios the impact of 
emissions trade is irrelevant, for others we find that the purchase/sale of permits 
could determine a significant redistribution of emissions among countries. Policy 
makers should take into account this important aspect when designing policies: the 
results confirm that increasing the perceived fairness and so obtaining widespread 
acceptability of international agreements will be needed in order to achieve any 
relevant objective, and this requires achieving a more equitable distribution over time 
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List of variables. 
 
C (n,t)=consumption expressed in trillions of 1990US$ 
L (n,t)= population expressed in millions. 
Q (n,t)=Gross production expressed in trillions of 1990 US$ 
Y(n,t) = Production net of environmental damage expressed in trillions of 1990 US$. 
CE (n,t)= Carbon energy expressed in gigatons 
I (n,t)= fixed investments expressed in trillions of 1990 US$. 
E = Total industrial CO2 emissions emissions expressed in gigatons. 
ETREE (n,t)= Land use carbon emissions expressed in gigatons. 
pe (n,t) = Cost of one unit of carbon energy expressed in thousands of $ per ton 
 
List of parameters 
α (n) = Elasticity of output to carbon energy (regional parameter) 
γ = Elasticity of output to capital (scalar) 
ζ (n,t)= Exogenous technical change effect of energy on CO2 emissions 
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Table 1   Scenarios description 
 
Scenario Description 
BAU Business as usual. No policy. 
Kyoto – 10% no 
trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario”. No market of 
pollution permits. 
Kyoto – 10% trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario”. Since 2015 
market of pollution permits. 
Kyoto – 10% + USA 
no trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario” for OHI, WE and 
EE. From 2035 USA is obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 2025. No market of 
pollution permits. 
Kyoto – 10% + USA 
trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario” for OHI, WE and 
EE. From 2035 USA is obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 2025. Since 2015 market 
of pollution permits. 
Global Kyoto  no 
trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario” for OHI, WE and 
EE. From 2035 USA and non Annex I regions are obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 
2025. No market of pollution permits. 
Global Kyoto trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. Further 
10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto – 10% forever scenario” for OHI, WE and 
EE. From 2035 USA and non Annex I regions are obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 
2025. No market of pollution permits. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
Temp no trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 2.5 
degree global atmospheric constraint. No market of pollution permits. 
Temp trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 2.5 
degree global atmospheric constraint. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
Conc no trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 ppm 
global atmospheric constraint.No  market of pollution permits. 
Conc trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 ppm 





Table 2. Percent of emissions reduction (Policy vs BAU scenario) in 2105. Annex I vs non Annex I regions. 
No trading scenarios. 
 
Kyoto – 10% Kyoto – 10% + 
USA 
Global Kyoto Temp Conc 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 









Table 3. Decomposition of the Theil index. Business as usual (BAU) scenario in 2055. 
 

















BAU 0.310 0.259 0.051 83.632% 16.368% 7.933% 1.893% 6.542% 
Kyoto 
no 
trading 0.303 0.250 0.054 82.260% 17.740% 9.430% 1.548% 6.763% 
Kyoto -
10% + 




trading 0.407 0.334 0.073 81.991% 18.009% 7.989% 2.248% 7.773% 
Temp 
no 
trading 0.342 0.292 0.050 85.335% 14.665% 7.209% 2.895% 4.561% 
Conc no 
trading 0.322 0.272 0.050 84.464% 15.536% 7.621% 2.322% 5.593% 
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         


























Table 4. Summary of the equity principles. 
 
Conc Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe in 2015. Since 2025 a 550 ppm global 
atmospheric constraint. 
CONCSOV Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe in 2015. Since 2025 a 550 ppm global 
atmospheric constraint. The global burden is shared 
according to the future responsibility of countries in 
generating emissions 
CONCBRAS Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe in 2015. Since 2025 a 550 ppm global 
atmospheric constraint. The global burden is shared 
according to the past responsibility of countries in 
generating emissions 
CONCEQUAL Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe in 2015. Since 2025 a 550 ppm global 




Table 5. Decomposition of the Theil index in a Between and a Within component for different equity 




Table 6. Summary of the sensitivity analysis for parameters. 
 




(TFP + 30%) 
 
+20% 
(TFP + 20%) 
 
+10% 
(TFP + 10%) 
 
-10% 
(TFP  - 10%) 
 
-20% 
(TFP - 20%) 
 
-30% 
(TFP  - 30%) 
 




(PHI + 30%) 
 
+20% 
(PHI + 20%) 
 
+10% 






(PHI - 20%) 
 
-30% 
(PHI - 30%) 
 
L (n,t) China 
and LI 
+ 30% 
(POP + 30%) 
+20% 
(POP + 20%) 
+10% 




(POP - 20%) 
-30% 
(POP - 30%) 
 Between Within Theil index 
Conc 0.272 0.050 0.322 
CONCSOV 0.258 0.050 0.308 
CONCEQUAL 0.041 0.032 0.073 













Table 7.  Sensitivity analysis. Value of the GDP Gini index and emissions pseudo Gini index compared to 





 GDP Gini index CO2 pseudo Gini index 
TFP + 30%  -13.203 -21.215 
TFP + 20%  -8.885 -14.586 
TFP +10%  -4.477 -7.479 
TFP - 10%  4.523 8.196 
TFP - 20%  9.051 16.730 
TFP - 30%  13.497 25.573 
PHI + 30%  0.032 10.004 
PHI + 20%  0.023 6.833 
PHI + 10%  0.013 3.481 
PHI - 10%  -0.005 -3.300 
PHI - 20%  -0.015 -6.872 
PHI - 30%  -0.025 -10.377 
POP + 30%  -1.798 -1.152 
POP + 20%  -1.093 -0.606 
POP + 10%  -0.482 -0.167 
POP - 10%  0.320 0.197 
POP - 20%  0.406 -0.032 









 Between Within Theil index 
TFP + 30%  0.144 0.056 0.199 
TFP + 20%  0.176 0.054 0.230 
TFP +10%  0.214 0.052 0.267 
TFP - 10%  0.313 0.049 0.363 
TFP - 20%  0.375 0.048 0.423 
TFP - 30%  0.447 0.047 0.494 
PHI + 30%  0.336 0.054 0.390 
PHI + 20%  0.310 0.053 0.363 
PHI + 10%  0.285 0.052 0.337 
PHI - 10%  0.235 0.050 0.285 
PHI - 20%  0.212 0.049 0.261 
PHI - 30%  0.190 0.048 0.237 
POP + 30%  0.263 0.053 0.316 
POP + 20%  0.263 0.052 0.315 
POP + 10%  0.262 0.052 0.313 
POP - 10%  0.257 0.050 0.307 
POP - 20%  0.252 0.049 0.301 
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Correlation between the GDP Gini index and the CO2 pGini index. A 
positive relationship 
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Correlation between the GDP Gini index the and CO2 pGini index.  An 
ambiguous relationship






















Figure 4. Kakwani index.  
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Figure 18.  
 
RICE99. MER GDP per capita, PPP GDP per capita (thousands of 1995$ per capita) and emissions per 
capita (Gigatons/billions of people) and emissions per capita in a BAU scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
